Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine two cognitively-based models of text comprehension, those of Kintsch (1988 Kintsch ( , 1998 and Werth (1999) , and to suggest how these might be combined, and integrated with a functional grammar in order to provide an overall model which takes us from a structured sequence of words to the understanding of the concepts conveyed.
In §2 I provide an illustrated summary of Kintsch's construction-integration model of comprehension, and §3 does the same for Werth's text world model. §4 then discusses the similarities and differences between the two approaches, suggests that they are by no means incompatible, and points out that what both lack is a grammatical component which they can hook up to in order to provide the initial stages of a full comprehension model. In §5 I examine the properties which such a grammar needs to have in order to be suitable for this task, and demonstrate that Role and Reference Grammar (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997, Van Valin in press) , is an appropriate choice. In §6 I show how the complete model can be applied to a short but complete text taken from the British National Corpus. The paper is rounded off with some concluding remarks in §7. Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) set out the principles of a strategic model of discourse comprehension, in which a basically bottom-up mode of operation, from words, through clauses, complex sentences, sequences of sentences, and global text structures, is complemented by feedback mechanisms from higher to lower levels. Their model distinguishes between two structures represented in episodic memory: a propositionally-organised textbase, in which propositions derived from the text, and the relationships between such propositions, are built up and stored, and a situation model, which is the cognitive representation of the situation reflected in the text, and may contain information derived from previous experience and from general knowledge. There is also a control system which regulates processing in short-term memory, acting on information concerned with the situation type, discourse type, goals of the participants and knowledge of textual macrostructures. The model is concerned not only with the building-up of propositions in the textbase and situation model, but also with the establishment of local coherence relations between sentences. Further levels of structure are also proposed: 'macrostrategies' infer, from the sequence of propositions expressed by a text, a set of macropropositions, which form the textual macrostructure, and can themselves be organised into even higher-level schemas, such as the narrative schema of Setting, Complication and Resolution. Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983: 8-9 ) recognise three important limitations of their model: the lack of a full model of the parsing process; the incomplete, intuitive and ad hoc specification of the knowledge base required for discourse understanding; and the lack of any specific representation of contextual information. Kintsch (1988) builds on the earlier work by incorporating a further layer of processing, the 'integration' component of the model. According to this modified view, the initial process of proposition construction, using information from the text and the user's knowledge base, is not heavily constrained, but can lead to multiple interpretations, incompatibility between propositions and lack of coherence. The output of this process is structured as an associative network of relations, which can then be tightened up, in the integration phase of comprehension, but means of mechanisms which have their roots in connectionist approaches. Although it is clearly not possible to go into detail about these processes here, a little more explanation, together with some exemplification, is required in order to get an idea of how the model works. From this point on I will refer to Kintsch (1998) , the more recent and detailed account of the model.
Kintsch's construction-integration model
The first step in the formation of a text base from the input text is the (ongoing) construction of propositions. points out that there is considerable evidence for the psychological reality of propositional representations, from studies of recall experiments, reading times and priming effects. Kintsch (1998: 54, 96) recognises that an explicit parsing component is missing from the current model; in practice, what he does is to carry out a manual propositional analysis of the text. As an example of this process let us take the text in 1 below, taken from the British National Corpus, and the analysis given in Figure 1 .
The skeleton acts as an internal physical barrier and is protective; the hard bony skull protects the brain; the vertebral column protects the spinal cord; and the ribs protect the lungs and heart. The intact skin acts as a barrier between the internal and the external environment which contains many potentially harmful agents. The filtering function of lymphatic tissue enables the tonsils and adenoids to trap pathogens. The cilia in the respiratory tract hasten the exit from the body of possibly harmful foreign material. By reflex action -a mechanism of the nervous system -the threatened hand is instantly withdrawn and the threatened eye closed. The eye is further protected by the constant secretion of tears. (BNC B14 523-529)
This analysis is similar to the one presented for a short text by Kintsch (1998: 62-63) , though I have attempted to remedy some (though by no means all) of the problems which, from a linguist's point of view, are evident in his analysis, without doing violence to his intentions. The first column lists, in order, the 'text elements' which are isolated by taking content words together with any preceding function words. Here, I have followed Kintsch's practice of treating prepositions as function words, and compound nominals (e.g. respiratory tract) as single items. The second column, in Kintsch's analysis, contains what he calls "the syntactic tags required for building propositions" (p62), but these are in fact a rather mixed bag of labels, with a clearly semantic basis: for instance, they include relationships such as 'specification' and 'source', and the terms 'subject/object' are clearly intended to reflect underlying semantic roles. I have therefore replaced the labels in this column with more clearly semantic ones. The third column contains propositions which are still being constructed and therefore incomplete: note that, with Kintsch, I indicate as yet unspecified components by referring forward to the items which will eventually complete the proposition, although clearly this cannot reflect what actually occurs in comprehension. The fourth and final column contains propositions which can be completely specified at the relevant point in the processing of the text. A further difference between my analysis and Kintsch's is that I have tried to make rather more transparent the semantic relationships coded by prepositional phrases in the text. Clearly, I have taken numerous decisions which could well be challenged: for instance I do not wish to make any claim for the particular set of semantic labels used in the second column. The aim is merely to give an idea of the kind of analysis envisaged in Kintsch's model.
The atomic propositions derived from the text (those in the fourth column of Figure 1 ) are combined into complex propositions, in which a number of atomic propositions may be subordinated to a single core proposition (p38). This is achieved by placing modifying propositions in their proper places in the overall structure. By way of exemplification, Figure 2 shows the complex propositions which could be formed from E1-E7 in our example text.
Drawing on the earlier account in Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) , Kintsch (1998: 39-40) proposes three levels of relationship between (potentially complex) propositions: indirect coherence, involving the sharing of a time, place or argument, the propositions being part of the same textual episode; direct coherence, in which the type of coherence just specified is supplemented by explicit markers such as and, so, then, therefore and the like; the third type of relationship is the subordination of one proposition to another, or to some component such as a single argument (e.g. in the case of restrictive relative clauses). For instance, in Figure 2 , there is direct coherence between P1 and P2, signalled by the connector and, but coherence is also achieved through the sharing of the argument BARRIER.
The analysis in terms of atomic and then complex propositions constitutes the microstructure of the textbase. There are also relationships of a higher order, which organise complex propositions into larger macropropositions, forming the global structure, or macrostructure, of the textbase (pp64-69). There is, Kintsch claims, strong evidence for the psychological reality of macrostructures. The operations which form macropropositions are governed by a set of 'macrorules ' (Van Dijk 1980) : any proposition which is not required for the interpretation of another proposition can be deleted; if each of a sequence of propositions entails a further proposition, then that more general proposition may be substituted for the sequence; and similarly a proposition which is entailed by a sequence of propositions, taken together, may be substituted for that sequence. For instance, in our example 1, the propositions in E8-E12, E13-E15 and E16-E19 present three sets of information which are exemplifications of the general statement made in E1-E7. Since the skull, vertebral column and ribs are all parts of the skeleton, and protect-s/-ive is repeated in each proposition, it is clear that each of the three later propositions is entailed by the combination of propositions in E1-E7, which we can therefore regard as the core, deleting the others. E 5 b a r r i e r r o l e E 2 As indicated by Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) and reiterated by Kintsch (1998: 67) , the formation of macrostructures depends on material available in the text itself, but also on general cultural knowledge. One example of a text-internal clue is the cohesive repetition of protect-s/-ive mentioned above. Another is the fact that a title, Physical barriers and secretions precedes the text shown in 1, pointing to a division of the text into E1-E60, which are concerned with physical barriers, and E61-E67, which deal with secretion. The general cultural knowledge needed to comprehend the text includes knowledge of the type of situation: the fact that we are concerned here with an informative text of a biological/medical nature concerned with the human body, that the writer will probably be someone not known personally to the reader, and perhaps even anonymous, and so on. As Kintsch (p68) observes, language users' knowledge of the ways in which particular text types are structured is also relevant to the formation of macrostructures. For instance, narratives (in our culture, at least) have a basic structure involving setting (or exposition), complication and resolution, and this schematic structure can be used in the assignment of macropropositions. The importance of schemas (scripts, etc.) is not confined to narratives, but is evident in many everyday situations, as illustrated by Kintsch's analysis of a text evoking the 'grocery-shopping script' (pp111-118).
In taking the step of forming macropropositions, then, we have begun to go beyond the information which is actually available in the text itself, to call upon the language user's knowledge of various kinds. Here, then, is where we start to move from the textbase into the situational model. Kintsch (p104) points out that the extent to which we need to fill out the textbase by means of a situational model will differ from one text to another, but that typically, the mental representation of a text is a mixture of the two kinds of information, in varying proportions.
So far, we have been concerned with the constructive part of Kintsch's constructionintegration model of comprehension. In order to understand the need for the second, integrative component, it is necessary to realise that the construction of the textbase may lead to alternative, possibly incompatible, interpretations of (part of) a text. Consider, for example, the word acts, which occurs twice as an intransitive verb in example 1. In this text, the appropriate meaning is the one which appears in the Collins English Dictionary as 'serve the function or purpose (of)'; however, there are also other meanings, such as 'to perform (a part or role) in a play, etc.', 'to conduct oneself or behave (as if one were)', and 'to behave in an unnatural or affected way'. Kintsch's contention (p95) is that propositions with all possible meanings of a word will be formed, but that the inappropriate readings will be rapidly suppressed. As a second example, consider the sentence in 2:
2. This is especially so in the case of visiting competitors. (BNC J7B 1248) This corresponds, potentially, to two different predications, one in which the competitors are visiting someone, the other in which they are being visited. According to the construction-integration model, both will be activated briefly. The suppression of inappropriate readings, and more generally the tightening up of the initial partially contradictory and incoherent set of propositions into a coherent structure, is achieved through the integration component of the model. In order to understand how this works, we need to say a little more about the form in which the knowledge base is claimed to be represented.
Knowledge, in the construction-integration model, is seen as an associative network, with nodes representing concepts and links between the nodes representing associations of varying strength between the concepts. In Kintsch's model (p74), the nodes of a 'knowledge net' are propositions, schematic constructs (schemas, frames, scripts) and production rules, all of which can be represented in the propositional format of predicates and arguments. The meaning of any given node is the whole set of relations, of varying strengths, which it contracts with its near and further neighbours. Kintsch points out, however, that in the processing of a particular piece of language, only those nodes which are actually active in working memory at the time form part of the meaning of nodes to which they are connected. In psychological terms, then, meaning is very flexible, being constructed on the fly, and so slightly different each time a concept is required.
We are now in a position to see, in outline, how the integration process works (Kintsch 1998: 98-103) . The basic principle is that of spreading activation, a process of key importance in connectionist models. Activation spreads to any given node from all the nodes which are its neighbours, according to their strengths of connection, in a process which has been mathematically modelled. Some links will be inhibitory, with negative strength values: for instance, a proposition will inhibit another proposition with which it is contradictory. Eventually, the activation process reaches a steady state. Nodes which have numerous positive connections with other nodes will be strengthened, while nodes with few and/or negatively weighted connections will diminish in importance and may even disappear. The model postulates that as text elements are processed, the new propositions formed are immediately integrated with the existing textual representation, but that integration at the end of a sentence is of particular significance in that for all but the shortest sentences the working memory will be saturated at this point, so that the text representation must be transferred into long-term memory, only one or two propositions being retained in working memory because they appear to be relevant to further processing 2 .
An important question, of course, is how we might go about constructing a knowledge base for use in testing the predictions of the construction-integration model. The method used by Kintsch and his associates involved a technique known as Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) (see Kintsch 1998: 86-91 and the references given there), in which the frequencies of word forms in a collection of texts are used to create a mathematical model of the strengths of association between words, also between (words and) sentences, and between texts. As Kintsch recognises, the information so obtained is limited in that no account is taken of syntactic relationships. Nevertheless, the technique has been shown to have considerable potential for knowledge representation.
In the second part of his book, Kintsch (1998) presents detailed empirical evidence in relation to word identification, the formation of macrostructures and their role in the putting together of textbases and situation models, the role of working memory in comprehension, memory for text, learning from text, and the solving of verballyposed problems in arithmetic, finally moving to consider action planning, problem solving, decision making, and the representation of the self, all in relation to the construction-integration model. Further work on the model and its applications can be found in Weaver, Mannes and Fletcher (1995) .
Given the concept-based nature of Kintsch's model, it seems pertinent to consider whether this approach could fruitfully be integrated, as part of the process component, into a more linguistically-oriented model of language. There are, however, some issues which need to be addressed.
Firstly, the relationship between words and concepts in the Kintsch model seems to me to be rather unclear. In his discussion of concepts and the construction of meaning, Kintsch states:
In a mental lexicon, one looks up the meaning of a word. In a knowledge net, there is nothing to look up. Meaning has to be constructed by activating nodes in the neighbourhood of a word. (Kintsch 1998: 76) But surely the nodes in a knowledge net are not themselves words, but concepts (furthermore, propositional concepts), so that the idea of 'the neighbourhood of a word' does not seem coherent: what we need to know is the relationship between a word and particular conceptual nodes in the network. This confusion is compounded by the LSA technique used as an approximation to knowledge nets: as outlined briefly earlier, this technique computes relationships between linguistic units (word forms, sentences, texts), and these are then taken to represent concepts. However, the relationship between the words of a language and the underlying concepts they encode is indirect, complex and culturally relative, and although this may not be of crucial importance in the context of a psychological theory of discourse comprehension, it is clearly a key issue for any linguistic theory which is concerned not only with psychological but also with sociocultural adequacy.
The idea of a network of conceptual relationships is, of course, not specific to Kintsch's model: such networks are also used both in cognitive-functional linguistics (see e.g. the Functional Procedural Grammar of Nuyts 1992 Nuyts , 2001 ) and in computational linguistics, where they go under the name of ontologies. Figure 3 shows the least detailed end of the conceptual ontology elaborated in the Mikrokosmos project. At first sight, there seems to be some discrepancy between Kintsch's knowledge nets and an ontological network of the kind displayed in Figure  3 , in that the nodes in a knowledge net represent propositional concepts, while those in the ontology represent entities, events and properties. This difference may, however, be more apparent than real. Kintsch's networks actually contain nodes referring to a wide range of concept types, from propositions themselves to complex frames, scripts and schemas; the important point is that all of these can be represented in propositional form. When we look in greater detail at the Mikrokosmos ontology, however, we find that concept definitions are presented as frame structures, and that the most important aspects of the knowledge model are the properties (relations and attributes) through which concepts are linked. These, like the nodes in Kintsch's knowledge nets, effectively build in propositional information. As an example, consider the representation for the concept ACQUIRE in the ontology (Beale, Nirenburg and Mahesh 1995: 5) . The frame for this concept specifies that the concept requires an AGENT which must be HUMAN, and a THEME which must be a non-human OBJECT. We could thus construct a partial specification in propositional terms:
Further slots are concerned with the basic nature of the concept (it IS-A type of TRANSFER-POSSESSION), the PURPOSE of acquiring (specified as BID), the INSTRUMENT (HUMAN or EVENT), a PRECONDITION (in terms of OWNership), a SOURCE (specified as HUMAN) and a LOCATION (some PLACE). Certainly it would seem that it is worth exploring, in future research, the relationships between Kintsch's knowledge nets and ontologies of the kind illustrated by Mikrokosmos. A second problem, as Kintsch himself has recognised, is that further work is needed on the provision of an adequate parsing component in the model. Kintsch (1998: 54) comments that he has had no success in taking already developed parsers as front ends to his comprehension model. What is clear is that in order to be consistent with the construction-integration model, a parser would have to be interactive, in the sense of using a variety of information sources in an integrated manner, rather than autonomous, with a separate syntactic parser running independently of semantic processing. It is also clear that the parser would have to operate on the principle that lexical activation is itself not highly sensitive to context; rather, the required lexical item is selected through a subsequent process of integration by spreading activation as described earlier.
Finally, Kintsch's work is concerned only with the comprehension of discourse, whereas in any comprehensive linguistic model we also need to address the discourse production process and its relationship with comprehension. Studies of discourse processing in production have so far lagged behind those concerned with comprehension.
Werth's text world model
In Werth's Cognitive Discourse Grammar, set out in some detail in a book (Werth 1999) 3 published a few years after his untimely death, the concept of discourse is defined as follows:
A deliberate and joint effort on the part of a producer and recipients to build up a 'world' within which the propositions advanced are coherent and make complete sense. (p51) Werth's book is concerned primarily with the question: how do we make sense of complex utterances when we receive them (as hearers or readers? (p7) and with the related question: how do we as speakers (writers) put together a complex utterance in order to express particular concepts? (p7) The model is thus intended to address the issues of both discourse comprehension and production. As a major part of the answer to both of the above questions, Werth advances the hypothesis that we form mental constructs which he calls discourse worlds, text worlds and sub-worlds, which are a subtype of the more general category of situation. A situation consists of (i) some location l i ; (ii) some time t j ; (iii) a set of entities {e n } such that at least one of these (p 1 ) must be a participant in the discourse, with the possibility of further participants (p 2-n ) and inanimate objects (o n ); (iv) a set of functions {r n }, such that the set of expressions mapping entities into functions holds at the specified location and time (p84). This definition allows the building up of rich worlds reflecting not only the semantic and pragmatic content of any proposition currently in the focus of attention, but also the knowledge invoked by that proposition and by the preceding discourse.
Two kinds of situations are represented together in a discourse: the immediate situation or discourse world and the textual situation or text world. The discourse world is "the situational context surrounding the speech event itself" (p83), and contains not only the discourse participants and the entities they can perceive, but also whatever they can work out from what they perceive, including the products of interaction with processes of remembering, imagining, and the like. The text world is "a deictic space, defined initially by the discourse itself, and specifically by the deictic and referential elements in it" (p51). It is "the 'story' which is the subject of the discourse, together with all the structure necessary to understand it" (p87). As Werth points out, most discourses are concerned with situations which are remote in time and space from the actual situation of discourse, though some are concerned with the discourse world itself. In both cases, Werth distinguishes the two types of world: when the discourse world itself is the topic of interaction, then the text world is that part of it which is in focus at the time. Werth notes (p20) that the concept of text world has something in common with Fauconnier's (1985 Fauconnier's ( /1995 concept of mental spaces, Fillmore's (1985) frames, and Lakoff's (1987) idealised cognitive models. Deictic and referential items given in the discourse specify times, places, people, objects, their properties and relationships. These, in turn, can activate frames, "areas of memory which relate to areas of experience and knowledge encoded as complex conceptual structures" (p51) 4 .
A crucial concept in Werth's model is that of context, since it provides the link between a text and the discourse of which it is the verbal part: a discourse is a text plus its relevant context (p47). The relevant situation is […] precisely restricted in every case by the text which its discourse produces, and the discourse provides just enough detail to set up a text world and to activate the relevant areas of knowledge. No further details are necessary than are provided by the discourse together with information available from the frames accessed by participant knowledge. (p80, emphasis in original)
An important feature of context in Werth's model is that it is not simply 'there', but is actually constructed in a process of negotiation on the part of the discourse participants (pp118-19). This dynamic, ethnographically-oriented approach to context has been characterised by Goodwin and Duranti as being concerned with … how participants attend to, construct, and manipulate aspects of context as a constitutive feature of the activities they are engaged in (Goodwin and Duranti 1992: 9) .
This means that
Instead of viewing context as a set of variables that statically surround strips of talk, context and talk are now argued to stand in a mutually reflexive relationship to each other, with talk, and the interpretive work it generates, shaping context as much as context shapes talk. (Goodwin and Duranti 1992: 31) This approach to context is reminiscent of that taken in Systemic Functional Linguistics, where the work of Martin, Hasan and others has adopted a dialogic perspective, according to which text and context are in a mutually dependent relationship (see the summary in Butler 2003b: 377-390 and the references given there). It would therefore be of interest to investigate the extent to which categories of contextual description derived from systemic accounts could be used to add depth of detail to Werth's more cognitively-oriented model.
The process of context construction in Werth's model leads to a set of propositions which acts as what Werth calls the Common Ground (CG), which is:
the totality of information which the speaker(s) and hearer(s) have agreed to accept as relevant for their discourse (p119)
That part of the CG which constructs the text world ('world-building' information) is background information, while that which is contributed by the discourse itself ('function-advancing' information) is foreground information. The CG alters as the discourse proceeds, with addition of new information and modification and decaying of old information (p120).
Particularly important to the building up of the CG is the shared knowledge of the discourse participants, which Werth (pp96ff) divides into general and mutual types. General (or public) knowledge is that which individuals possess because they belong to particular social groupings, and is divided into cultural and linguistic subtypes. Cultural knowledge is characterised as being "partially structured, open-ended and contingent" (P97), and the structured elements of it are stored in frames. Linguistic knowledge, on the other hand, is "structured, systematic and analytical" (p98). The two types of general knowledge are seen as linked in complex ways. Mutual knowledge is private knowledge which comes about, during interaction, by the incrementation of the CG as the discourse proceeds. It may be derived from the mutual perceptions of the immediate situation of the discourse, or from shared experience, that is, situations in which both/all the discourse participants have directly participated, or with which they have some specifiable connection. Cross-cutting the distinction into general and mutual knowledge is that between propositional and functional types (pp101-07): propositional knowledge expresses 'facts' of a cultural, linguistic, perceptual or experiential nature; while functional knowledge is concerned with the ability to act towards some particular goal, and can again be of any of the four types outlined above. Werth (p110) links this distinction to a typology of frames, distinguishing between propositional, content-oriented frames, and functional frames of the type which cognitive linguists call 'image schemata', based on physical and conceptual action.
The CG is also crucial to the treatment of textual coherence in Werth's model. It is proposed that a Coherence Constraint filters out all non-coherent propositions. This constraint is expressed in terms of the CG as follows:
… for any proposition there is a Common Ground (CG) relating to the same discourse as the proposition under consideration, and this proposition bears one of the functional conditions with respect to that CG. (Werth 1999: 129) The functional conditions concerned here are those of full or partial synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy, metonymy or metaphor. It is proposed in Werth (1984) that a mechanism of 'emphasis placement' converts coherence into patterns of Given and New information and their realisation.
Werth also makes interesting suggestions about the shape of a semantics which would be compatible with his cognitively-based discourse model, distinguishing (p157) between what he calls the 'modality' function of language ("the situating of the information with respect to the current context") and the information function This comes very near the beginning of a chapter in a novel. There will, of course, be elements already available to the reader from the previous discourse, but I will concentrate here on just this passage, to show how the text world corresponding to the situation described in it can be created. First of all, let us examine the 'worldbuilding', deictic and referential, elements of the passage, which relate to time, place and the entities mentioned (p187). With regard to time, the tense locates the action in the past with respect to the time of narration, and a few minutes later locates the action of coming through the doorway with respect to that of going into the kitchen. 5 The distinction between 'modality' and 'informational' functions looks rather like the distinction between interpersonal and ideational/representational function, made in Systemic Functional Grammar (see e.g. Halliday and Matthiessen 2004) and Functional Grammar (Dik 1997a (Dik , 1997b , where meanings concerned with probability and with social deixis would be interpersonal in nature. Figure 4 , in which vertical arrows represent 'paths', while horizontal arrows represent modifications using steady state predications, and also clause connections. In addition to the relationships explicitly signalled in the text, we must take into account those which can be inferred, including those arising from the interaction of textual elements with the reader's knowledge of appropriate schematic structures or frames. For instance, even without any previous context to guide us, we can infer that Mrs Hobden moved to and from a room in which she and Robert are both located at the beginning of the mini-text in 4. Furthermore, we can infer that the tea and biscuits are on the tray which Mrs Hobden brings from the kitchen. The mention of trays, tea and biscuits also invokes a culturally significant frame concerned with the provision of light refreshments for visitors.
The above brief account has by no means done justice to the richness and complexity of Werth's text worlds model: for instance, I have not talked about subworlds (Werth 1999: Chapter 8) , or the techniques of 'revealed reference' and 'accommodation', by means of which the presence of a referent in a text world is taken to be assumed without having been explicitly established (1999: Chapter 9). Nevertheless, I hope that I have been able to give at least a general idea of what Werth has in mind. A book-length application of Werth's model in relation to the area of negation in fictional writing can be found in Hidalgo Downing (2000).
Towards a synthesis of approaches
It is obvious, from the preceding accounts, that there are major differences of orientation and aims between Kintsch's and Werth's models. Kintsch is concerned to establish a psychological theory of discourse comprehension, which explicitly models the processes of construction and integration through which we are said to come to an understanding of a discourse, and present empirical evidence bearing on the claims made. Werth, on the other hand, is concerned with a specification of the overall mental models which we create in response to a text embedded in its situation, without presenting any detail of the psychological processing involved, or any psycholinguistic evidence.
Despite these clear differences, however, there are some interesting similarities between the two approaches. Both, in their rather different ways, stress the importance of both the text itself and its context: Kintsch's model distinguishes the textbase and the situation model, while Werth's has a parallel distinction between the information derived from the text and the situational information which is activated by the textual information. Both scholars adopt an essentially constructivist approach to discourse processes: Kintsch emphasises that meanings are not just 'there', but are constructed through activation of nodes in the knowledge net, sensitive to the context; Werth stresses that context is not something fixed and external, but is constructed as the discourse proceeds. Both models use propositional structures and although Werth does not follow Kintsch in proposing that non-propositional knowledge should be expressed propositionally, he does recognise that 'functional' knowledge can, in principle, be converted to propositional knowledge (Werth 1999: 103) . It would be useful to investigate the extent to which Kintsch's hierarchy of atomic propositions, complex propositions and macropropositions can be mapped on to the text worlds and subworlds of Werth's model. Clearly, a discourse model which uses propositional representations is an advantage in terms of specifying the relationships between discourse structures and clauses, which also encode propositional information.
It does, then, seem worthwhile for future research to explore the relationships between these models, in order to arrive at a more comprehensive picture of discourse processing which could form part of our overall model. Furthermore, it would be instructive to examine the extent to which the units and relationships proposed in various functionally-based approaches to discourse relate to the categories and relationships of Kintsch's and Werth's models. Suitable candidates for further study would include: the units of Hengeveld's (2004a Hengeveld's ( , 2004b , forthcoming) Functional Discourse Grammar; the rank-based hierarchy of units in Sinclair and Coulthard's (1975) model of discourse; the idea units realised by intonation or punctuation groups in the proposals of Roulet (1997) , Chafe (1994) and Hannay (1998) ; the acts and subacts of Mackenzie's (2000 Mackenzie's ( , 2004 Incremental Functional Grammar; the stretches of discourse connected by functional relations in Rhetorical Structure Theory Thompson 1987, 1988) ; and the functional elements of Hasan's (1978 Hasan's ( , 1984 Hasan's ( , 1985 Hasan's ( /1989 generic structure potentials.
A final similarity between the Kintsch and Werth approaches which is of some consequence for our own purposes is concerned with the linkage, or lack of it, between the discourse model and an underlying theory of semantics and form. As we have seen, Kintsch's model is not linked to any specific underlying linguistic theory which could provide appropriate semantic and syntactic representations. Indeed, as Kintsch himself remarks (1998: 60) , for the psychological purposes for which the model is intended, "we do not need a logically consistent system or a detailed semantics". Similarly Werth, despite recognising relationships with the cognitive linguistic work of scholars such as Lakoff, Fauconnier and Fillmore, does not provide any account of how his discourse model, or the semantics which underlies it, hook up to a more detailed specification of meanings, forms and the relationships between the two. It is to such a specification, and its links with other components of the overall model of linguistic communication, that we now turn.
In search of an appropriate grammatical component

The role of the grammar in comprehension
Introduction
A survey of work in the comprehension of spoken language is available in Cutler and Clifton (1999) , and a parallel survey for written language in Perfetti (1999) ; the following brief summary draws heavily on these two sources. I shall start from the point where a word has been recognised, either form the spoken input stream or from a written text: models of how recognition occurs, which are covered in the survey articles cited above and also in the briefer and simpler survey by Reeves, HirschPasek and Golinkoff (1998) , are less relevant to our present concerns. As far as spoken language is concerned, it will suffice to say here that it is generally agreed that word recognition occurs by a process of competition between candidate words which are activated as a result of compatibility with some part of the speech signal Cutler and Clifton 1999: 134) . There are two main types of model which appear to account well for the recognition of written words: the Dual Route Model proposes that written words are identified, according to the particular circumstances, either by a direct route from graphemic information to the word representation, or by a route which is mediated through grapheme-phoneme relationships (Perfetti 1999: 173-74) ; the PDP (parallel distributed processing) model postulates that word recognition occurs through distributed patterns of activation during propagation across layers of units of several kinds (Perfetti 1999: 171-72) .
The question which is of greatest interest here is what kinds of information the successful lexical candidate brings with it for use in subsequent stages of comprehension. In what follows, we shall look briefly at evidence for the participation of morphological, semantic and syntactic phenomena in comprehension. Cutler and Clifton (1999: 139-40) summarise the evidence for morphological structure in the stored forms of words, concluding that morphologically complex words in English are probably activated as the full form, though recognition of a spoken word will make available morphological information, such as marking for tense and number, which aids in the construction of higher-level units. The authors add that a model which is valid for English may not hold for languages of other morphological types. Perfetti's review of written language comprehension claims that "readers can be quite sensitive to the morphological structure of words under some circumstances (1999: 180), though it is an open question whether words are actually decomposed into their morphemes during reading.
Morphology
Semantics
Clearly, the meaning of a word, in its context, is of paramount importance for the listener or reader in deciding what part that word plays in the utterance being decoded 7 . Cutler and Clifton's (1999: 140-41) summary of evidence regarding the semantic information available on spoken word recognition suggests that all meanings of an ambiguous word are potentially available, but that all but the most contextually appropriate meanings decay rapidly, to the extent that very strongly biasing contexts can virtually suppress activation of all but the meaning which best fits the context. For written language comprehension, Perfetti (1999: 182) concludes that most of the experimental results obtained can be accommodated under the view that all meanings of an ambiguous words are indeed activated, but that the extent of activation depends on the context of utterance, and also on the frequency of the meanings concerned 8 . Wingfield and Titone (1998: 253-57) , in their discussion of experimental evidence regarding the role of context, also come to the conclusion that multiple meanings are initially activated for ambiguous words, and that context then filters out all but the meaning most appropriate to the context.
Syntax
An introductory treatment of the role of syntax in sentence processing can be found in Wingfield and Titone (1998) , and a much more detailed account, angled towards neurocognitive considerations, in Hagoort, Brown and Osterhout (1999) , on which much of the current section is based. There is a strong general consensus in the processing literature that syntactic processing is a central component of comprehension as well as production:
… it is a nearly universally accepted notion in current models of the production and interpretation of multiword utterances that constraints on how words can be structurally combined in sentences are immediately taken into consideration during speaking and listening/reading. (Hagoort, Brown and Osterhout (1999: 273) As a simple illustration of the importance of syntax, Hagoort, Brown and Osterhout point to the fact that we can parse sentences without understanding their meaning, in cases where nonsense words are embedded in a normal syntactic structure. A frequently cited example is from Lewis Carroll's poem Jabberwocky from Through the Looking Glass: when we read or hear 'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe, there is a lot that we can deduce about the structure: brillig and slithy are adjectives, tove and wabe nouns, gyre and gimble verbs; slithy is a modifier of toves; and so on.
There is also evidence from reading studies that reading rate decreases at clause boundaries, indicating that such boundaries are important in online processing (for a summary see Wingfield and Titone (1998: 236-37) .
Although the importance of syntax in comprehension seems to be beyond doubt, the detailed operation of syntactic parsing in language comprehension is still the subject of vigorous debate, as Cutler and Clifton (1999: 142-43 ) point out. Perfetti's (1999: visual, tactile, kinaesthetic, action-oriented) through which information about the concept is acquired, see Saffran and Sholl (1999) . 8 The importance of frequency in comprehension is also suggested by work on Event Related Potentials (ERPs) in the brain, which demonstrates a component sensitive to the frequency of occurrence of the eliciting word in the language as a whole (see the summary in Kutas, Federmeier and Sereno (1999: 366) and the reference cited there).
182-86) brief summary of work on parsing during reading presents a similarly diffuse picture of the state of the art. Hagoort, Brown and Osterhout (1999: 276-80 ) discuss five areas of debate about the precise nature of the parsing mechanisms. Firstly, there is the question of whether the same devices are used for parsing and for grammatical encoding during language production; the authors regard this as an open issue at present. Secondly, we need to know whether the same parser is used for both listening and reading; most models of comprehension assume a common parser, which is augmented with extra speechspecific information sources in listening. Thirdly, there is a debate concerning the type of working memory resource (general or dedicated) used for parsing. Fourthly, there is the question of what sources of information are used to assign a structure to a string of words during comprehension: some models propose that a structure is first built wholly on syntactic principles, and then passed to a semantic interpreter; other approaches postulate that a number of sources of information (pragmatic and semantic as well as syntactic) immediately combine to guide the formation of the structure. The authors' view is that recent evidence favours the second of these claims. Finally, there is still some debate about whether an actual syntactic structure is produced at all during comprehension: although it is generally agreed that syntactic information is used, some scholars hold that the information from various levels is integrated into a direct mapping between word-level information and an interpretation of the sentence. Hagoort, Brown and Osterhout (1999: 280-305 ) go on to discuss the evidence on syntactic processing which has been accumulating in recent years from electrophysiological studies, brain imaging techniques and the effects of anatomical lesions. Lack of space precludes further discussion of this work here.
The components of an adequate grammar
Although there is still clearly a very long way to go in unravelling the complexities of language comprehension, the above brief review of what is known about processing provides us with some clear guidelines about what components should figure in our grammar. The model will certainly need to have separate semantic and morphosyntactic representations, together with a lexicon. The claim that semantic and discoursal information is used in the determination of syntactic structures during processing means that the various components, though separate, interact in complex ways. Finally, the fact that we are looking for a theory for incorporation into a usagebased, processing-oriented model suggests that a functional approach would be most appropriate.
At the semantic level, our grammar should deal with propositional structure and meaning. Thus, we need to account for:
• the semantics of predicates and their arguments, and of satellites/adjuncts
• the roles associated with arguments and satellites/adjuncts
• the content and structuring of meanings, such as those of tense, aspect, modality, illocution, definiteness, etc, which are realised grammatically in many languages.
The lexicon will, of course, need to play a key part in the model, especially in view of the well-documented importance of lexical selection processes in language production and comprehension. Clearly, any psychologically adequate model of the lexicon must take fully into account what is known of mechanisms of lexical storage and access. Although research in this complex area has not yet led to any definitive view, it does seem that spreading activation models of the kind proposed in Kintsch's constructionintegration theory have considerable explanatory power. It is also important to bear in mind the likelihood that many multiword sequences are stored and retrieved as (partially or fully) pre-formed chunks, at least in certain processing conditions (for detailed discussion and a model of 'formulaic' language see Wray 2002 ).
Finally, we need an expression component, to convert lexicalised syntactic structures, with their semantic mappings, into the final form of the utterance.
5.1.6 Role and Reference Grammar as an appropriate grammatical component for a comprehension model
In this section I shall demonstrate that Role and Reference Grammar (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997, Van Valin in press) fulfils the requirements detailed above 9 .
In common with other functional theories, RRG recognises the (partial) semantic motivation for syntax. However, Van Valin (1990) argues that in order to capture crucial syntactic differences between languages, a distinct level of syntax is required. The syntactic elements postulated for the clause are core and periphery. The core contains the nucleus (housing the predicate) together with the core syntactic arguments of the predicate; the periphery contains optional adjuncts (non-arguments).
In some languages, the clause has a pre-core slot, which is the position in which wh and fronted items occupy in English; some other languages have a post-core slot with similar functions. Outside the clause, but inside the sentence, there may be left detached and/or right detached positions, marked off from the clause itself by punctuation, or by pausing in the spoken language. Clear syntactic evidence for the distinctness of left detached elements and the pre-core slot has been adduced from several languages. The syntactic structure of the simple sentence in 5 is given in 6: The syntactic structure given above is the constituent projection for the sentence. Associated with this are two further structures: (i) the operator projection, showing the values of operators for properties such as illocutionary force, tense, aspect, modality, etc., and the unit in the structure to which each is attached; and (ii) the focus projection, showing the domain of focus in the sentence, within the potential focus domain allowed by the language concerned. For the above example, the operator projection would show that declarative illocutionary force and past tense are associated with the unit clause, the former operator having scope over the latter. The focus projection would show, in the default reading of the sentence, that the actual focus domain is the constituent Monte Carlo, falling within the potential focus domain for English, which is the whole clause.
The syntactic configurations which are possible in a given language are stored as a set of constructional templates. In many ways these are analogous to the constructions of Construction Grammar, with the important exception that Construction Grammar postulates that all types of information are integrated into a construction, while RRG keeps the syntactic inventory of templates separate from the lexicon. An example of a constructional template for the clause is shown in Figure 4 , taken from Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 74) . 7. be-in′ (Monte Carlo, [do′ (1sg, [meet′ (1sg, 3sgF) 1998, Faber and Mairal Usón 1999) . The FLM in turn develops the potential of the lexicon in Functional Grammar (Dik 1997a (Dik , 1997b by importing from Coseriu's (1981) lexematics the structuring of the lexicon in terms of lexical fields, or domains. The rich lexical structures developed in the FLM thus provide the detailed semantic decomposition which was lacking in RRG.
Logical structure configurations, such as that in 7, automatically determine what semantic roles will be associated with the arguments of the predicate. The first argument of the locational predicate be-in′ has the thematic relation LOCATION, the first argument of the activity predicate do′ (identical to the first argument of meet′) is an EFFECTOR, while the second argument of the activity predicate is a PATIENT. Thematic roles can be generalised into two larger classes known as macroroles; Actor and Undergoer, the allocation of which is determined by the Actor-Undergoer Hierarchy shown in Figure 5 . If there are two or more core arguments in a clause, the default is for the argument furthest to the left in the hierarchy to act as Actor, while the one furthest to the right acts as Undergoer. For example 5, then, I, the first argument of do′, is the Actor, while her, the second argument of meet′, is the Undergoer.
ACTOR UNDERGOER
RRG also postulates syntactic and semantic structures for noun phrases, which for the sake of simplicity are not included in the above representations.
Semantic and syntactic representations are linked by separate cross-linguistically tested mapping algorithms going from semantics to syntax (needed for language production) and syntax to semantics (needed for comprehension). Details of these mapping rules for simple clauses can be found in Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 172-178, 317-436) , and a summary in Butler (2003a: 143-148 ).
In the light of the above sketch of RRG, let us revisit the desiderata for the grammatical component of a comprehension model. We came to the conclusion that an appropriate theory must have separate semantic and morphosyntactic levels of representation, a lexicon, and of course mechanisms which relate all these components. RRG, we have seen, does indeed have distinct syntactic and semantic representations, a lexicon which is central to the theory, and sets of mapping algorithms which involve all of these. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in Mairal Usón and Faber's synthesis of RRG with the FLM, it is proposed that lexical entries should be linked to a conceptual ontology, so that each lexeme points to a particular path in that ontology. They suggest, for instance, that the Affected Object of the predicate whittle should be specified by means of linkage to the path terminating in the concept WOOD in the Mikrokosmos ontology (see Figure 3) , as shown in 8, while the Affected Object of mow is specified by linkage to the path terminating in the concept GRASS as shown in 9.
A worked example
It will be clear from the foregoing discussion that there are many important issues to be resolved regarding the compatibility of the various components in the model I have outlined, and the ways in which these components might interact. This is certainly not the place to attempt to resolve those issues: they must form the backbone of a future research program. All I can do, in conclusion, is to present a partial analysis of a single short, authentic text, attempting to show something of how the various components might work. The text I shall discuss is shown in 10. This is a complete text, which forms part of the British National Corpus and is taken from the obituary section of the British broadsheet newspaper The Guardian. The provenance of the text activates culturally embedded frames concerned with both obituaries and UK broadsheet newspapers. From the obituary frame, the reader will expect to be told • that someone important has died
• who that someone was
• (usually) how old they were
• some important things about their lives.
The reader will also expect that the passage will consist largely, if not entirely, of statements, related to past time. From the fact that the obituary appears in a broadsheet rather than a tabloid newspaper, we might expect a fairly formal style, though this is certainly an oversimplification of the facts.
As an illustration, I shall discuss just the first sentence in relation to the retrieval of the underlying predication, starting with the orthographic words. The technique adopted is an informal one: I take each word in turn, and indicate briefly the processes which might be claimed to occur in the processing of that word in the ongoing stream, and the kinds of knowledge on which these processes draw.
Max:
Our culturally-based linguistic knowledge tells us that this may be a proper name, a forename for a male person (or conceivably a shortened form of Maxine, a female name), probably European/American. Since the word is not a lexical verb or an auxiliary, the parser may set up the hypothesis that the clause is going to be declarative, rather than imperative or interrogative. The parser provisionally activates an RRG core template with an initial argument slot. Note, however, that max can also be an abbreviation for maximum: according to Kintsch's spreading activation model, this meaning will be activated too, but upon integration with further information in the clause, this meaning will become deactivated.
Grundig:
The capital letter and knowledge of naming systems suggests this is a surname. Our cultural knowledge may associate the name Grundig with the well-known makers of sound equipment, since the obituary frame leads us to expect information about a person of some cultural importance. Max Grundig can be established as a character in the text, in terms of Werth's text worlds model. The proper name links to specification of human beings (and, provisionally, maleness) , in the conceptual knowledge net to which descriptions of lexical items refer.
,
The comma signals, provisionally, some following expansion of Max Grundig.
81:
This fulfils the expectation, from the obituary frame, of being told the age of the deceased. The reader must invoke cultural knowledge of ways of expressing age: the use of years as a measure is not the only possible way. The item links to the appropriate number concept in the knowledge net.
,
The second comma delimits the additional information.
died:
This is a lexical verb, confirming the declarative status of clause through association with unmarked SV order. The parser can now specify further the core template structure involved, as one with ARG + PRED. The lexeme DIE links to an appropriate path in the knowledge net, so that a logical structure expressed in terms of conceptual primitives can be formed. The appearance of this word furthermore confirms the frame-based expectation that we will be told of a death, and also the expectation of situations relating to past times.
yesterday:
Coming after an SV structure, this can be interpreted by the parser as an Adjunct, a peripheral element being added to the core template. This lexical item links to a time specification path in the knowledge net, giving additional past time information consistent with past tense of verb, again in conformity with the obituary frame.
in:
The parser will interpret this as introducing a further Adjunct, probably one of location.
Baden Baden:
The parser attaches this as the complement of the preposition in and adds the Adjunct to the core template. This item also confirms the locational meaning, linking to paths relating to place in the knowledge net.
.
On recognition of the full stop as an end of sentence marker, the parser can conclude that it has formed the complete structure of the sentence.
During the ongoing processing, syntactic template selection has occurred, the final result being the core-4 template proposed by Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: Interleaved with the syntactic processing, semantic interpretation of the structure has occurred. The predicate-argument relations of DIE, as well as the decomposition of the meaning, are retrieved from the structure of the ontological concepts on to which this item maps. The single syntactic argument is linked to the sole (Undergoer) macrorole of the predicate. The concepts to which IN and YESTERDAY are linked are also retrieved and added into the emerging propositional structure.
Similar analyses could be produced for the other sentences in the text. In Figure 6 , I have shown a possible propositional rendering for the complete text, along the lines set out earlier for Figure 1 . Again, there are aspects of the analysis which are certainly open to dispute, but I do not want to get bogged down in the detail of alternative semantic analyses here, as the aim is merely to indicate how the model might work. Figure 7 sets out the complex propositions of the text.
As successive items arrive on the input stream, the propositions formed are integrated with the cognitive model constructed so far, and at the ends of (at least some) major syntactic units, the short term memory buffer is cleared and a skeleton model is retained for further processing. The building of a coherent mental model is aided by the links between the concepts activated by items in the text: for instance, there are close conceptual links among the lexical items shop, sell, pay, money, and also radio, television, tape recorder; the anaphoric pronoun he and the determiner his can unambiguously be taken as referring to Max Grundig, it to the shop, where to Furth and which to the tape recorders.
As all this occurs, the reader builds the appropriate text worlds. As suggested in §3, embedded in the discourse world involving the writer and the readers of the obituary, we have a text world peopled by characters (Max Grundig, the Allies, musicians) and objects (the shop, transistor radios, tape recorders). We saw that location in time and space is particularly important in this text, and that deictic shifts in these parameters can be related to the creation of sub-worlds.
Conclusion
In this paper I have outlined and exemplified two important cognitive models of text comprehension, Kintsch's construction-integration model and Werth's text worlds model. Although these are in many ways very different, the former being rooted in cognitive psychology and the latter in textual analysis, they share some important characteristics: both stress the importance of the text itself, and of the context of text reception; both adopt a constructivist approach to discourse processes; both make use of propositional structures. Unfortunately, both also lack any explicit link to an underlying theory of semantics and form. 
